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RECONCEPTUALIZING CHEVRON AND DISCRETION: A
COMMENT ON LEVIN AND RUBIN
GARY S. LAwsON*
Professors Ronald Levin and Edward Rubin want to change the
way we think about important administrative law concepts. Ronald
Levin's paper, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered,1 ar-
gues that Chevron's2 currently ill-defined second step ought to be
reconceptualized as an application of arbitrary or capricious review.
Edward Rubin's paper, Discretion and Its Discontents,3 is part of his
ongoing project to reconceptualize the way we think-and, more im-
portantly, the way we talk-about the modern administrative state.
Professor Rubin suggests that the oft-used word "discretion" does not
usefully describe the bureaucratic operation of the modern manage-
rial state and that it profitably could be replaced with vocabulary
drawn from the theory of bureaucracy. 4
I am in substantial agreement with both papers. Accordingly, my
comments are directed to some implications of their analyses that
warrant further consideration. 5
I. THE ANATOMY OF CHEVROM. STEP Two RECONSIDERED
Professor Levin's paper is a commentator's nightmare. It is well
argued, well written, and almost certainly right. I couldn't have said it
better myself.
Indeed, I have said it considerably worse myself. I recently ar-
gued that, under presently governing scope of review principles, appli-
cation of Chevron should not exhaust judicial scrutiny of agency legal
interpretations. 6 I argued that Chevron concerns the validity (reason-
* Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1253 (1997).
2. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3. Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1299 (1997).
4. See id. at 1323 n.71.
5. In other words, I am going to chide Professors Levin and Rubin for failing to address
questions that no reasonable authors in their positions would have thought it necessary or appro-
priate to address.
6. See Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure, and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for
Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 314-16 (1996). My previous work, like Professor
Levin's article, did not address the normative question whether current scope of review doctrine
is desirable, and I intend to avoid that issue here as well.
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ableness) of the agency's outcome, while the arbitrary or capricious
standard, codified in § 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"), 7 further regulates the process by which the agency reached
its decision.8 The two tests work in tandem to ensure that agencies
interpreting statutes reach reasonable results through reasonable deci-
sionmaking processes. I described the instructions that the combina-
tion of Chevron and the arbitrary or capricious test gives to judges
reviewing agency legal conclusions in the following terms:
Ensure that the agency provided all procedures required by law.
Then ask, pursuant to Chevron, if the agency's outcome is a reason-
able "fit" with the statute. Do not require the agency's interpreta-
tion of the statute to be correct (as determined by whatever theory
of statutory interpretation the court employs), but rather require
that the conclusion be one that a reasonable person could reach. If
the agency's interpretation satisfies this deferential outcome test,
then ask whether the process by which the agency reached that con-
clusion was "arbitrary" or "capricious." A nonarbitrary, non-
capricious agency process must at least attempt to determine the
correct interpretation of the statute. Require the agency to explain
how it tried to reach a conclusion using traditional tools of statutory
interpretation. Generously defer to the agency's identification and
application of the relevant interpretative tools, but ensure that the
agency sincerely attempted to use actual interpretative tools. If, but
only if, the agency genuinely and reasonably concludes that tradi-
tional tools of statutory interpretation are ineffective in this case,
allow the agency to employ considerations of policy in resolving the
matter. Review of those considerations should follow the tradi-
tional "hard look" approach: ensure that the agency identifies and
articulates the factors that it considers and the assumptions that it
makes; determine (with an appropriately deferential attitude) if
those factors and assumptions are substantively rational; and ensure
that the agency applied its articulated considerations reasonably,
logically and consistently. 9
Professor Levin reaches essentially the same conclusion through
a different route.10 Rather than have both steps of Chevron govern
the agency's outcome, Professor Levin would convert step one into an
7. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994) ("The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law .
8. See Lawson, supra note 6, at 325-26.
9. Id. at 331.
10. Professor Mark Seidenfeld has also strongly urged extension of "hard look" principles
to Chevron. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmak-
ing in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994). And Professor
Bernard Bell has urged courts to look closely at the interpretive methodologies employed by
agencies in statutory cases. See Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation to Improve the
Legislative Process: Can It Be Done in the Post-Chevron Era?, 13 J.L. & POL. 105, 106 (1997).
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all-things-considered assessment of the substantive reasonableness of
the agency's interpretation and make step two a straightforward appli-
cation of arbitrary or capricious review.11 There would then be no
separate application of § 706(2)(A) to agency legal conclusions.
Sign me up. Because Professor Levin's reconceptualized step two
does exactly the same work as arbitrary or capricious review, the ef-
fect of his proposal is to convert the statutory interpretation aspect of
Chevron into a one-step determination on the merits: is the agency's
interpretation reasonable, taking into account everything that is rele-
vant to statutory interpretation in the modern administrative state?
This would be a major step forward for scope of review doctrine. 12
After all, we have a "Chevron two-step" only because of the accident
of Justice Stevens' prose in Chevron. And it was clearly an accident.
As Professor Levin points out, the Supreme Court in Chevron had no
intention of reformulating the law of scope of review; the Court evi-
dently thought that it was simply applying settled law. 13 Justice Ste-
vens, at least, certainly had no intention of fomenting a revolution, as
evidenced by the fact that he tried to undo the changes wrought by
Chevron at his first opportunity.14 It is therefore a bit odd to treat the
precise language employed by Justice Stevens in Chevron as the ca-
nonical formulation of the principle of deference to agency legal inter-
pretations. The odd and seemingly inconvenient attempt to divide the
world of statutory interpretation between steps one and two has made
the already difficult task of judicial review almost unmanageable. 15 If
Professor Levin can effectively eliminate step two as an independent
11. See Levin, supra note 1, at 1282-86.
12. I have previously advocated reformulating Chevron as a one-step test, though without
offering much explanation. See Lawson, supra note 6, at 314 n.5; Gary Lawson, Proving the Law,
86 Nw. U. L. REV. 859, 884 n.78 (1992).
13. See Levin, supra note 1, at 1257 & n.16.
14. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447-48 (1987) (attempting to limit Chevron
to cases of law application). The four-Justice concurrence in NLRB v. United Food & Commer-
cial Workers Union Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 133-34 (1988), has generally been taken as a reaffir-
mation of the "strong" reading of Chevron that grants deference to agency decisions on pure (or
abstract) questions of law. See, e.g., Wagner Seed Co., Inc. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir.
1991):
Wagner contends that because this dispute concerns a "pure question of statutory inter-
pretation," no deference is due to the EPA. In this regard, it relies upon certain deci-
sions of this court that were superseded by the Food Workers case, 484 U.S. at 123, 108
S. Ct. at 420-21. The Court there confirmed that judicial deference is owed to the
agency under step two of Chevron even when the only ambiguity involves "a pure ques-
tion of statutory interpretation." See id. at 133-34, 108 S. Ct. at 426 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) ....
15. As Professor Levin, myself, and others such as Mark Seidenfeld have pointed out,
courts have managed the problem largely by ignoring step two. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note
10.
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(and undefined) aspect of the review process, he will have done us all
a favor.
Professor Levin's reconceptualization, however, will not avoid
one critical problem that faces all of us who insist-whether we rely
on Chevron, § 706(2)(A) of the APA, or both-that agencies must ex-
plain and justify their choices among permissible interpretations of
ambiguous statutes. Under Professor Levin's formulation, an agency
survives step one of Chevron if its interpretation is a reasonable read-
ing of the statute, taking into consideration all factors that legitimately
enter into the interpretative process. 16 Step two then applies tradi-
tional arbitrary or capricious review, which includes the requirement
that agencies articulate reasons for exercising their discretion in one
way rather than another.17 In the Chevron context, this would require
agencies to explain why they chose their particular interpretation of
an ambiguous statute from among the universe of available choices
that also would have passed step one if they had been selected. As
Professor Levin puts it, "asking for a reasoned explanation of the
agency's choice is precisely what step two is about.' 18
But defining what counts as a "reasoned explanation" for choos-
ing from among a range of permissible interpretations of a statute is a
bit more complicated than it seems. Agencies make many important
decisions that cannot, in any realistic way, be traced to the statutes
that they administer. Nothing in § 655(b)(5) of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act ("OSHA"), 19 for example, tells OSHA how to
draw a dose-response curve for toxic substances in the absence of any
data concerning low-level exposure.20 The agency's choice of a curve
is a legislative choice that must be explained (justified) by reference to
efficiency, fairness, administrative convenience, and a host of other
considerations that courts accept as legitimate tools of policymaking.
This traditional arbitrary or capricious review for agency policymak-
ing2' only kicks in when statutory analysis breaks down or is obviously
16. See Levin, supra note 1, at 1282-86.
17. See id.
18. Id. at 1285-86 n.140.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 655 (b)(5) (1994).
20. See Lawson, supra note 6, at 330.
21. Arbitrary or capricious review, of course, applies to many agency actions besides discre-
tionary acts of policymaking. It applies to agency fact-finding when no other review provision
governs, see Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 745 F.2d 677
(D.C. Cir. 1984), and it applies to mundane acts of discretion, such as a choice not to grant more
procedures than positive law requires, see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519 (1978), not to initiate a rulemaking, see WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807 (D.C.
Cir. 1981), and not to reopen a proceeding in the face of changed circumstances or new evidence,
see ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270 (1987).
[Vol. 72:1377
RECONCEPTUALIZING CHEVRON AND DISCRETION
futile. By the same token, Chevron only kicks in when the relevant
statute seems to have something to say on the subject at hand. If the
statute says enough to dictate the correct decision with sufficient clar-
ity to satisfy step one of Chevron,22 then the case is resolved on that
basis. But if the statute does not clearly dictate the correct decision,
then the agency's interpretation survives step one as long as the inter-
pretation is within a (potentially broad) zone of reasonableness. In
the normal case, many interpretations will fall within this zone; any of
those interpretations, by hypothesis, will survive judicial review under
step one. Professor Levin's step two then instructs judges to require
agencies to explain why they picked the interpretation under review
from among the set of interpretations that are within the zone of rea-
sonableness under the statute.23 Here, however, is where Professor
Levin's easy equation of traditional hard look review with his antici-
pated Chevron step two review may break down. The kinds of rea-
sons that courts generally accept as legitimate for agency policy
choices are not necessarily the kinds of reasons that courts should ac-
cept for agency interpretations of statutes. Instead, agencies should
have to justify their choices of statutory interpretations, in the first
instance, by reference to theories of statutory interpretation. 24
An example that I have used elsewhere25 illustrates the point.
The substantial evidence test for fact-finding gives considerable defer-
ence to agencies; courts are obliged to affirm agency decisions even
when the court thinks, on balance, that the agency is wrong. But the
substantial evidence test is a standard of proof for appellate courts to
apply on review; it is not the standard of proof that the agency should
be expected to employ in its initial decision. It would not be proper
for an agency to say, "We think that the facts, on balance, support a
decision for X. But we have policy reasons for wanting Y to win, and
although the weight of the evidence supports X, there is enough in the
record on Y's behalf to survive substantial evidence review. Accord-
ingly, we will rule in favor of Y." Agencies may in fact do this all the
time, but it is not a proper exercise of agency authority. Standards of
appellate review are deferential for reasons of efficiency, economy,
and fairness. 26 They presuppose that there has already been a full and
22. How clearly the statute must dictate the result is a major, and perhaps the major, issue
in the application of Chevron.
23. See Levin, supra note 1, at 1285.
24. For a powerful elaboration of this point, see Bell, supra note 10, at 156.
25. See Lawson, supra note 6, at 329.
26. See Lawson, supra note 12, at 883-87.
1997]
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fair opportunity for the parties to win before a previous tribunal. It
would be a perversion of those standards of review to allow the initial
decisionmakers to treat them as licenses to reach, with legitimacy (as
opposed to impunity), any results that will survive appellate review. If
a reviewing court knows that an agency deliberately let the weaker
factual argument defeat the stronger, the agency decision should be
reversed as arbitrary or capricious, even if the weaker argument sur-
vives the substantial evidence test.
The same principles hold true when agencies interpret statutes.
Chevron instructs courts to give agencies some leeway by affirming
interpretations that the courts think are wrong, but not too egre-
giously wrong. That does not, however, relieve the agencies of their
obligation to try to get the right answer in the first instance. An
agency does not do its job simply by concluding that an interpretation
that it favors on policy grounds will survive Chevron step one review
on appeal. The agency must conclude that its chosen interpretation is,
all things considered (and policy concerns may be part of that mix-
ture), the best available interpretation of the relevant statute.27 Ac-
cordingly, when an agency explains why it chose a particular
interpretation of a statute, the first reasons out of its mouth should be
framed in terms of conventional criteria of statutory interpretation.
Traditional arbitrary or capricious review, framed in the language of
policymaking, will be applicable only if (and this will sometimes hap-
pen) traditional tools of statutory interpretation do not yield even a
best resolution to the question of statutory meaning. Professor
Levin's step two and traditional arbitrary or capricious review there-
fore merge only when there is a "false Chevron" issue: that is, where
at first glance the statute seems to say something meaningful about
the problem, but on further inquiry, the problem turns out to be one
of pure policymaking.
In order to make the scheme of review favored by Professor
Levin (and by me) work, courts must ensure that agencies have made
a good-faith effort to interpret statutes correctly. (Agencies in fact
have an obligation to do their very best to interpret statutes correctly,
but the deferential standard of review means that appellate courts en-
force a somewhat lesser obligation.) That task, however, requires
27. I have elsewhere suggested that even the best available interpretation of the statute may
not be good enough to be deemed correct. See Lawson, supra note 12, at 891-94. The best
available alternative standard, however, is the minimum standard that one can reasonably
impose.
[Vol. 72:1377
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courts to have some idea what a good-faith effort would look like.
And that is not as simple a task as it seems.
The embarrassing fact is that our legal system has no governing
theory of statutory interpretation. Various people will tell you that
any or all of the following considerations are relevant: the language of
the statute, the immediately surrounding context of the statutory lan-
guage, the context of the entire act of which the statute is a part, the
context of the entire universe of legislation, the general background
and purpose of the statute, the statute's legislative history, canons of
construction, and good social policy. The list is obviously partial, even
on its own terms. For instance, in considering statutory language, in
any of its variations, one might look for either the language's original
meaning or its present meaning. Moreover, the phrases "legislative
history" and "canons of construction" conceal enormous possible vari-
ations in what is considered admissible to prove statutory meaning.
Legislative history, for example, can consist of hearing transcripts,
floor statements, committee reports, conference committee reports,
and presidential signing statements. The individual categories can be
subdivided further: floor statements, for instance, might be viewed dif-
ferently depending on whether they are statements by proponents or
opponents of the legislation, statements by the legislation's spon-
sor(s), or statements that reliably can be known to have been actually
made rather than inserted into the Congressional Record after the
fact. There is simply no consensus in our legal system about which of
these (and other) considerations are admissible evidence of statutory
meaning.
Even more pointedly, once one determines which considerations
are admissible, there is the additional problem of determining their
relative weight. Two people can agree entirely that, for example, all of
the considerations listed above are legitimate, but strongly disagree
about the hierarchy of importance of the various considerations (for
example, whether legislative history trumps canons of construction, or
whether either of those considerations can trump any of the various
admissible forms of statutory language). There is no consensus in our
legal system about the appropriate significance or weight to be given
to the many considerations that plausibly can be thought relevant to
statutory interpretation.
Our legal system has dealt with this problem by burying it very
deep beneath the ground. Apart from some occasional outbursts from
19971
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Justice Scalia,28 judges say very little about interpretative methodol-
ogy. And when they do speak, clarity and consistency are not often
their hallmarks. Most judicial statutory interpretation takes place
without explicit articulation of the governing norms of admissibility
and significance.
Explicit articulation, however, is the focal point of arbitrary or
capricious review in the modern administrative state. Professor Levin
and I would effectively have courts force agencies to be clear about
the considerations that drove their interpretative process. And courts
accordingly have to be clear about their own rules of admissibility and
significance for determining statutory meaning-at least to the extent
of determining whether the agencies have relied on inadmissible con-
siderations or have clearly assigned an inappropriate weight to admis-
sible evidence of statutory meaning.
Perhaps it would be good for the legal system to bring these is-
sues out into the open. Maybe we need some explicit judicial articula-
tion of the rules of evidence for proving statutory meaning. Then
again, considering the likely outcome of such a process, maybe the
whole matter is best left buried, and Professor Levin and I should just
shut up about Chevron.
II. DISCRETION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Professor Rubin's paper is a commentator's nightmare. It is well
argued, well written, and almost certainly right. I won't even try to
say it myself.
It is very hard to argue with the proposition that bureaucratic
organizations are best described by terminology designed to describe
bureaucratic organizations. Professor Rubin correctly and usefully
has pointed out that much of the language of modern administrative
law is anachronistic. 29 Even those of us who long for the good old
days of private law and constitutional government 30 can agree that
events have overtaken our conceptual framework as rapidly as they
have overtaken our Constitution and our liberties. Professor Rubin
has amply demonstrated that the term "discretion" does not really
28. See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 620 (1991) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (objecting to the use of legislative history).
29. See Rubin, supra note 3, at 1300.
30. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1231 (1994) (arguing that most of the twentieth century, and a good portion of the nineteenth, is
unconstitutional).
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communicate very much that is useful in describing modern
administration. 31
The real question is: what do we do about that fact? Not every
error should be corrected; the costs of error correction will sometimes
exceed the benefits of getting it right. There are some errors that are
simply best lived with. The use of the term "discretion" in administra-
tive law, instead of more analytically useful terminology, may be such
an error.
The costs of changing our vocabulary are likely to be very high.
As Professor Rubin recognizes, the word "discretion" is deeply (even
if inaptly) ingrained in our legal culture; it would require a large-scale
transformation in the thought and speech patterns of a great many
people in order to effect any significant change in legal vocabulary.32
Moreover, the term "discretion" is not merely a part of the common
parlance of administrative law; it is concretely embedded in some of
our most important statutes. For instance, as Part I of this comment
illustrates, the APA instructs courts to invalidate agency action that is
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law."'33 Even if one fully accepts Professor Rubin's cri-
tique of the concept of discretion, one still must figure out what to do
with the word as it appears in the APA34 and in the numerous organic
statutes that also employ it.
Thus, the transition costs from the present linguistic regime to a
more accurate one are likely to be substantial, and the benefits of a
change in vocabulary are uncertain and probably impossible to iden-
tify with any precision. When all is said and done, the game may in-
deed be worth the candle, but we cannot tell without some sense of
just how much the distortion of understanding produced by our pres-
ent conceptual framework generates a distortion in doctrine. Much of
31. See Rubin, supra note 3, at 1323.
32. See id. at 1336 ("The term discretion is too familiar to replace, and any concerted effort
to do so would only seem awkward and artificial.").
33. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
34. The word "discretion" also appears in § 701(a)(2) of the APA, which exempts from the
APA's judicial review provisions agency action that is "committed to agency discretion by law."
Id. § 701(a)(2). Modem doctrine requires us to give meaning to this usage of "discretion"-and
to reconcile it with the usage in § 706(2)(A). The correct interpretation of § 701(a)(2), however,
probably relieves us of any obligation to interpret the word "discretion" in that context. Almost
surely, the phrase "committed to agency discretion by law" was understood in 1946 to codify the
range of questions that traditionally had been regarded as unreviewable by courts. The phrase,
in other words, is essentially code for "those forms of agency action that courts traditionally have
not reviewed." See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 607-10 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). On this
understanding, there is no occasion to give specific meaning to the term "discretion" in
§ 701(a)(2).
1997]
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Professor Rubin's recent work addresses precisely this issue in other
contexts. I eagerly look forward to seeing the present article inte-
grated into his larger project.
STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS
